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Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc.: Oklahoma’s
Ostensible Destruction of Stream-of-Commerce Personal
Jurisdiction*
I. Introduction
Interstate and international commerce drive the economy. 1 Consequently,
many products travel a multistate or multinational distribution channel
before reaching consumers.2 When these products injure a consumer, the
consumer may want to seek a remedy in court. In order for the court to
render a binding judgment over the manufacturers and distributors who may
be responsible for the consumer’s injury, the manufacturers and distributors
must be subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction. 3
There are several ways to establish personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident party: consent, service within the forum state, or through the
party’s contacts with the forum state. 4 The stream-of-commerce theory
describes a particular contact capable of subjecting a party to a forum’s
personal jurisdiction. When a party places its products into a distribution
channel seeking to serve a state’s economy or consumers, the party is
forging a contact capable of subjecting it to the state’s personal
jurisdiction.5
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oklahoma College of Law, 2021. Special thank you to
Professor Steven S. Gensler for his insight, guidance, and mentorship throughout this Note’s
drafting. And thank you to Allyson Shumaker and Michael F. Waters for their conscientious
editing of this Note. All errors, of course, are my own.
1. The United States imported over $2.5 trillion worth of goods in 2019. Consumer
goods composed nearly $654 billion—over 25%—of imported goods. Press Release, Bureau
of Econ. Analysis & U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade in Goods & Services:
November 2020, at pt. A, exhibits 1, 6 (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/
files/2021-01/trad1120.pdf.
2. See Mihir Torsekar, Intermediate Goods Imports in Key U.S. Manufacturing
Sectors, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://usitc.gov/research_and_analysis/ trade_shifts_
2017/specialtopic.htm#_ftnref28 (last visited Jan. 17, 2021) (discussing the proliferation of
supply-chain globalization).
3. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (“[P]ersonal
jurisdiction . . . is an ‘essential element of the jurisdiction of a district . . . court,’ without
which the court is ‘powerless to proceed to an adjudication.’” (quoting Emps. Reinsurance
Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937))).
4. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880–81 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (explaining that if the defendant is not served in the forum state and does not
consent, then due process requires that it “purposefully avail[] itself” to the forum state).
5. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980).

523

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

524

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:523

Before Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc.,6 an Oklahoman injured
by a product could rely on the stream-of-commerce theory to establish a
manufacturer’s or distributor’s contact with Oklahoma. But in Montgomery,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court ostensibly eliminated the stream-ofcommerce theory as a basis for establishing Oklahoma’s personal
jurisdiction. With sparse explanation and questionable interpretations of
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, the court declared, “[S]tream of
commerce is no longer the analysis this [c]ourt will use to determine
specific personal jurisdiction.”7
This Note will scrutinize Montgomery’s ostensible destruction of the
stream-of-commerce theory and explain why the uncertainty Montgomery
leaves behind is particularly troubling. Part II of this Note describes the
stream-of-commerce theory’s development. Part III discusses
Montgomery’s facts, analysis, and holding. Part IV examines Montgomery’s
missteps and suggests two interpretations of the stream-of-commerce
theory’s current status in Oklahoma. Then, Part V proposes two ways the
Oklahoma Supreme Court can resolve Montgomery. Finally, Part VI
encourages Oklahoma courts to interpret Montgomery narrowly.
II. Development of the Stream-of-Commerce Theory
Personal jurisdiction is a constitutional protection housed in the Due
Process Clause. 8 Due process requires that a party have certain ties or
connections to a forum state as a prerequisite to the forum state’s power to
render a binding judgment over it.9 These ties or connections may be
established when a party creates contacts with, or reaches out to, the forum
state.10 Contacts between a party and the forum state can create general
6. 2018 OK 17, 414 P.3d 824.
7. Id. ¶ 37, 414 P.3d at 834.
8. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017) (“It
has long been established that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of
state courts.”).
9. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .”). The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause generally controls both
federal and state personal jurisdiction analyses because federal personal jurisdiction is
predominantly coextensive with the state’s personal jurisdiction where the federal court is
located. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service
establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a
court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located . . . .”).
10. Walden, 571 U.S. at 284.
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jurisdiction (“all-purpose jurisdiction”)11 or specific jurisdiction (“caselinked jurisdiction”).12 Contacts-based specific jurisdiction has three
distinct requirements: (1) the party reached out to the forum state, (2) the
lawsuit “arise[s] out of or relate[s] to” that act, and (3) the forum’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction would not be unfair or unreasonable. 13
The stream-of-commerce theory describes a particular way a party can
reach out to the forum state, thereby subjecting it to the forum’s specific
personal jurisdiction. 14 This Note, accordingly, will focus on due process’s
requirements for a forum to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a party
based on that party’s contacts with the forum state.
A. Emergence of Minimum Contacts
Courts’ power to exercise personal jurisdiction was restricted initially to
the territorial boundaries of the state where the court was located. 15 Courts,
consequently, could only exercise personal jurisdiction over people who
were located within the state or who owned property there.16 But territorial
personal jurisdiction quickly proved unworkable because courts needed
more power to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents as interstate
travel and commerce became commonplace. 17
International Shoe Co. v. Washington18 revolutionized courts’ ability to
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents by adding contacts as a

11. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)
(explaining that general jurisdiction, or “all-purpose jurisdiction,” allows a court to hear any
claim asserted against a party).
12. See id. (explaining that specific jurisdiction limits the court’s adjudicatory authority
to claims connected to a party’s contacts with the forum state).
13. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 127 (2014)).
14. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 920 (holding that a stream-of-commerce contact cannot
establish general personal jurisdiction).
15. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (“The authority of every tribunal is
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”).
16. See id. at 728 (explaining that a person must be served in the state or have his or her
property attached to be subject to a court’s personal jurisdiction).
17. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) (noting the need for personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents due to “technological progress” and “increased . . . flow of
commerce between States”); see also Michael Vitiello, Due Process and the Myth of
Sovereignty, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 513, 521 (2019) (attributing the expansion of states’
jurisdictional power to the “development of modern transportation”).
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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basis for personal jurisdiction.19 International Shoe concluded that due
process is satisfied when a court exercises personal jurisdiction over a party
that has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”20 But the Court did not explain which acts constitute
“minimum contacts” with the forum state. The Court instead suggested that
the act’s “nature and quality and . . . circumstances” determined whether it
was sufficient to subject a party to the forum’s personal jurisdiction. 21
These amorphous minimum-contacts guideposts led to a question the Court
still grapples with today: which acts constitute minimum contacts with a
forum state?
The answer, under current law, is that minimum contacts requires a party
to have reached out to the forum state attempting to exercise personal
jurisdiction over it.22 When the Court established this requirement in
Hanson v. Denckla,23 it explained that the minimum-contacts analysis
centers on a party’s choice to reach out to the forum state. 24 A party
manifests this choice by “purposefully avail[ing] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State.”25 A contact, in other words, is
a party’s volitional act of reaching out to the forum state.
There are many different ways a party can reach out to the forum state.
Courts have recognized physical presence in the forum state; 26
correspondence, 27 negotiations, and commercial interactions with the forum

19. See Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal Jurisdiction,
71 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1408 (2018) (noting that “International Shoe revolutionized the
constitutional contours of personal jurisdiction” with its “new constitutional standard” of
minimum contacts).
20. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
21. Id. at 318.
22. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (explaining that due process
limitations “principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant” and therefore the
contact must be created by the “defendant himself”).
23. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
24. See Richard D. Freer, Justice Black Was Right About International Shoe, but for the
Wrong Reason, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 587, 593 (2019) (explaining that Hanson established that
“there can be no personal jurisdiction without the defendant’s volitional engagement of the
forum”).
25. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
26. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (noting that
physical presence in the forum state is a contact between the party and the forum state).
27. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss3/5

2021]

NOTES

527

state’s residents; 28 and circulating magazines in the forum state29 as acts of
reaching out. Intentional torts, moreover, are considered acts of reaching
out when a party’s tortious conduct targets the forum state and the party
knows the brunt of the conduct’s effects will be felt there.30 Courts even
accept overtly commercial internet activity as an act of reaching out.31 Soon
after Hanson, courts began to recognize that placing products into the
stream of commerce with the intent to serve the forum state’s market is an
act of reaching out to that forum.
B. Stream-of-Commerce Theory of Personal Jurisdiction
The stream-of-commerce theory is the Illinois Supreme Court’s
brainchild, introduced in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp.32 In Gray, the court determined that Illinois could exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident party whose valves were used in an
appliance that was sold to and then injured the plaintiff in Illinois. 33 The
court reasoned that if a party chooses to “sell its products for ultimate use in
another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage
caused by defects in those products” because the party presumably
contemplated its products’ use in that state. 34
The stream-of-commerce theory was created to fill a gap in personal
jurisdiction doctrine. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that, by
placing products into a distribution channel bound for Illinois,
manufacturers and distributors could sell their products for ultimate use in
Illinois without establishing contacts subjecting them to its personal
jurisdiction.35 To close this gap, the court treated placing products into a
distribution channel—the stream of commerce—as an act of reaching out to
the state where the products are sold to consumers.36

28. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479–80.
29. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
30. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984).
31. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125–26
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
32. 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
33. Id. at 762, 767.
34. Id. at 766.
35. See id. (“[I]t should not matter that the purchase was made from an independent
middleman or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into this State.”).
36. See id. (“[T]he use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient
contact with this State to justify a requirement that [the party] defend here.”).
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The U.S. Supreme Court first explored the stream-of-commerce theory in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.37 There, an automobile retailer
sold a car in New York to the plaintiffs, who then drove it into Oklahoma
where they were injured in a car accident.38 Oklahoma could not exercise
personal jurisdiction over the car’s retailer and wholesaler, the Court
explained, because there was no act by which the defendants reached out to
Oklahoma.39 The defendants had not solicited business from, advertised in,
or sold cars to Oklahoma’s market.40 But if the defendants had been seeking
to serve Oklahoma’s market, then subjecting them to Oklahoma’s personal
jurisdiction would not have offended due process.41 World-Wide
Volkswagen established that placing products into the stream of commerce
with the intent to serve the forum state’s market is a contact capable of
subjecting a party to the forum’s personal jurisdiction.
The Court’s next stream-of-commerce discussion, in Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court,42 generated two primary stream-ofcommerce tests: (1) stream of commerce “plus” and (2) “pure” stream of
commerce. 43 The difference between these tests centers on the acts that
constitute reaching out to the forum state.
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion concluded that merely placing a
product into a distribution channel does not constitute reaching out to the
forum state.44 The plurality opinion’s stream-of-commerce-plus test instead
required that the party place its products into a distribution channel and do
“something more” demonstrating an intent to serve the forum state’s
market. 45 The “something more” could be specifically designing a product
for the forum state’s market, advertising in the forum state, or establishing
channels of communication with the forum state’s consumers.46
37. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
38. Id. at 288, 299.
39. See id. at 295.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 297–98 (noting that due process is not offended if a forum asserts personal
jurisdiction over a party who “delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State” (citing Gray, 176
N.E.2d at 766)).
42. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
43. Justice Stevens, however, advocated for a third test focused on the “the volume, the
value, and the hazardous character of the [products].” Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 112 (plurality opinion).
45. Id. at 111–12.
46. Id. at 112.
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Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, in contrast, determined that a party
reaches out to the forum state when there is a “regular and anticipated flow
of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale” and the party “is
aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State.” 47 The
concurring justices argued that a party placing its products into the stream
of commerce in that manner ultimately benefits from that act.48 So it is not
an undue burden to force it to litigate any harms resulting from that act in
the state where the product was sold to consumers.49
The Court’s next, and most recent, stream-of-commerce discussion took
place in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,50 and it also failed to
muster a consensus as to the acts required to establish a contact with the
forum state. In McIntyre, an English manufacturer sold its metal-shearing
machines to an American distributor, intending for those machines to be
sold throughout the United States. 51 One of its machines injured the
plaintiff in New Jersey.52
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion endorsed Justice O’Connor’s streamof-commerce-plus test and clarified that the party’s contact must be with
the specific state attempting to exercise personal jurisdiction over it.53 For
New Jersey to exercise personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer,
therefore, its distribution scheme must have targeted New Jersey’s market
or consumers.54 The plurality opinion concluded that New Jersey could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer because the
manufacturer’s distribution scheme targeted the United States as a whole—
not the State of New Jersey specifically. 55
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion argued that New Jersey could
exercise personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer because its nationwide
distribution scheme was an act of reaching out to every state where its

47. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
51. Id. at 878, 886 (plurality opinion).
52. Id. at 878.
53. Id. at 884–85.
54. See id. at 884 (“The question is whether a defendant has followed a course of
conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to judgment
concerning that conduct.”).
55. Id. at 886–87.
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machines were sold to consumers. 56 The plurality opinion troubled the
dissenting justices because under the plurality opinion’s analysis, a foreign
manufacturer could evade personal jurisdiction in the United States simply
by targeting the U.S. market as a whole. 57
Uncomfortable with the strong stances taken by the plurality opinion and
the dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion determined that
precedent alone decided this case. 58 Justice O’Connor’s stream-ofcommerce-plus test was not satisfied because there was no additional
conduct demonstrating the manufacturer’s intent to reach out to New
Jersey’s market.59 Justice Brennan’s pure-stream-of-commerce test,
moreover, was not satisfied because the few machines that had been sold in
New Jersey did not amount to a “regular and anticipated flow” of
products.60
To this day, the Court has failed to agree on which acts establish that a
party has reached out to a forum state in stream-of-commerce cases. Lower
courts, unsurprisingly, are also split.61 Despite the chasm of disagreement
among lower courts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court appears to be the only
court to refuse to apply any stream-of-commerce test to establish personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents.

56. See id. at 898, 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that New Jersey’s personal
jurisdiction was proper because the product’s arrival in New Jersey was not “random[] or
fortuitous[]”—it resulted from a “deliberat[e]” distribution scheme targeting every state).
57. See id. at 893. The plurality opinion did note, however, that Congress may have the
ability to activate national contacts-based personal jurisdiction, which would authorize any
federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign party based on the party’s
contacts with the United States. See id. at 885 (plurality opinion). See generally William S.
Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205 (2018)
(advocating for a “national-contacts approach” to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign
parties).
58. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 887, 892–93 (Breyer, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 888–89.
60. Id.
61. Compare Knox v. MetalForming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 2019) (treating
Justice Breyer’s McIntyre concurrence as binding and noting agreement with the D.C.
Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Federal Circuit), with Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d
760, 780 (3d Cir. 2018) (rejecting the pure-stream-of-commerce test and explaining that the
Third Circuit follows the Asahi and McIntyre pluralities’ stream-of-commerce-plus test), and
Monge v. RG Petro-Mach. (Grp.) Co., 701 F.3d 598, 619–20 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to
choose between stream-of-commerce tests).
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III. Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc.
A. Facts & Procedural History
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s dismissal of Montgomery v. Airbus
Helicopters, Inc. for lack of personal jurisdiction hinged on the defendants’
contacts with Oklahoma.62 The case arose from an air-ambulance crash in
Oklahoma City, which resulted in the deaths of two Oklahomans: the
helicopter’s pilot and the flight nurse. 63 Anke Montgomery (the pilot’s
widow), EagleMed, L.L.C. (the air-ambulance service), and Starr Indemnity
and Liability Co. (EagleMed’s insurer) brought tort claims in an Oklahoma
court against Airbus Helicopters, Inc. (the helicopter’s vendor), Honeywell
International, Inc. (the helicopter engine’s manufacturer), and Soloy, L.L.C.
(the engine-conversion kit’s manufacturer).64 The plaintiffs alleged that a
defect in the helicopter’s air-intake system had allowed ice to invade the
compressor, leading to an engine flameout and subsequent crash. 65
Airbus and Soloy moved the court to dismiss the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction, arguing that they had no contacts subjecting them to
Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction.66 Neither Airbus nor Soloy, they
contended, had sought to do business in Oklahoma by reaching out to its
market or consumers, including EagleMed’s air-ambulance base in
Oklahoma.67 Airbus, indeed, had delivered the helicopter to EagleMed in
Texas—not Oklahoma.68 And Airbus’s communications with EagleMed
had been directed to EagleMed’s principal place of business in Kansas. 69
Soloy, similarly, had sent its engine-conversion kit to EagleMed’s principal
place of business in Kansas.70 The plaintiffs argued that Oklahoma
nonetheless could exercise personal jurisdiction over Airbus and Soloy
because they had sold their products knowing that EagleMed would use

62. 2018 OK 17, ¶ 1, 414 P.3d 824, 825.
63. Id. ¶ 2, 414 P.3d at 825–26.
64. Id. ¶¶ 4, 11, 414 P.3d at 826–27.
65. Id. ¶ 3, 414 P.3d at 826.
66. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 414 P.3d at 827–28. Honeywell did not raise the defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction, waiving the argument. Id. ¶ 12, 414 P.3d at 827.
67. Id. ¶ 14, 414 P.3d at 828.
68. Id. ¶ 5, 414 P.3d at 826. Airbus is a Delaware corporation, and its principal place of
business is in Texas. Id. ¶ 4, 414 P.3d at 826.
69. Id. ¶ 9, 414 P.3d at 827.
70. Id. ¶ 7, 414 P.3d at 826. Soloy is a Washington corporation, and its principal place
of business is in Washington. Id. ¶ 4, 414 P.3d at 826.
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them in Oklahoma.71 The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and
granted Airbus’s and Soloy’s motions to dismiss, holding that Oklahoma
lacked personal jurisdiction over them. 72 The Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari.73
B. The Court’s Analysis & Decision
The issue before the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether Airbus and
Soloy had established contacts subjecting them to Oklahoma’s personal
jurisdiction.74 The court immediately took general personal jurisdiction off
the table because neither defendant was incorporated in Oklahoma nor
maintained its principal place of business there. 75 Then, the court set forth
the requirements for an Oklahoma court to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction: (1) the defendant “purposefully directed activities” at
Oklahoma, (2) the claims “arise out of or relate to those activities,” and (3)
exercising jurisdiction would not be unreasonable or “offend the traditional
notions of substantial justice and fair play.”76 Because Oklahoma’s longarm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause’s limitations on
personal jurisdiction, the court evaluated these requirements through the
lens of the Due Process Clause. 77
The court began its analysis by recounting two recent U.S. Supreme
Court cases: Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court and Walden v.
Fiore.78 Bristol-Myers, the court noted, held that personal jurisdiction may
71. Id. ¶¶ 8, 14, 414 P.3d at 826, 828.
72. Id. ¶ 13, 414 P.3d at 828.
73. Id.
74. Id. ¶ 1, 414 P.3d at 825.
75. Id. ¶¶ 4, 16, 414 P.3d at 826, 828–29. A corporation is subject to a forum’s general
jurisdiction when its affiliations with the forum state are “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as
to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011)). A corporation is considered “at home” in its state of incorporation and in its
principal place of business. Id. at 137 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924).
76. Montgomery, ¶ 16, 414 P.3d at 829.
77. Id. ¶ 18, 414 P.3d at 829; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); 12
OKLA. STAT. § 2004(F) (Supp. 2018) (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any
basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United
States.”).
78. Montgomery, ¶¶ 19–26, 414 P.3d at 829–31 (first discussing Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); and then discussing Walden v. Fiore, 571
U.S. 277 (2014)).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss3/5

2021]

NOTES

533

be exercised consistent with the Due Process Clause only when the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state are connected to the particular
claims asserted against it.79 The court concluded that Bristol-Myers required
it to overturn its precedents approving of personal jurisdiction under the
“totality of the contacts” and “stream of commerce” approaches, which
lacked an explicit connection requirement.80 The court then observed that
Walden had concluded that a defendant’s relationship with a third party,
standing alone, does not subject it to a forum’s personal jurisdiction. 81
Airbus’s and Soloy’s relationship with EagleMed, therefore, did not subject
them to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction. 82 Similarly, the court explained,
a plaintiff’s unilateral activity in the forum state does not subject the
defendant to that forum’s personal jurisdiction. 83 EagleMed’s unilateral
decision to operate the helicopter in Oklahoma, therefore, did not subject
Airbus or Soloy to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction. 84
After discussing Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach, which
this Note explains in detail below,85 the court briefly discussed the U.S.
Supreme Court’s similarly titled stream-of-commerce theory. 86 Because the
Court had not discussed the stream-of-commerce theory in Bristol-Myers or
Walden, those cases, the court concluded, “presumptively, at least
implicitly, reject[ed] such analysis.”87 Conflating Oklahoma’s “stream of
commerce” approach with the similarly titled—but completely different—
stream-of-commerce theory, the court viewed them both as “stream of
commerce” analyses and declared, “[S]tream of commerce is no longer the
analysis this [c]ourt will use to determine specific personal jurisdiction.” 88
The court also, without further explanation, cited two cases remanded in
light of Bristol-Myers as supporting its conclusion.89 The court then

79. Id. ¶ 22, 414 P.3d at 830.
80. See id. ¶ 36, 414 P.3d at 833.
81. Id. ¶ 26, 414 P.3d at 830–31.
82. Id. ¶ 36, 414 P.3d at 833.
83. Id. ¶ 36, 414 P.3d at 834.
84. Id.
85. See infra Section IV.B.1.
86. Montgomery, ¶¶ 32–35, 414 P.3d at 832–33.
87. Id. ¶ 27, 414 P.3d at 831.
88. Id. ¶ 37, 414 P.3d at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. ¶ 36, 414 P.3d at 834 (first citing Murco Wall Prods., Inc. v. Galier, 138 S. Ct.
982 (2018) (mem.); and then citing Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Lawson, 138 S. Ct.
237 (2017) (mem.)).
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affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction.90
IV. Montgomery Was Right Until It Went Wrong
Part IV sets forth Montgomery’s missteps and advances two
interpretations of the stream-of-commerce theory’s current status in
Oklahoma. Section IV.A addresses what Montgomery got right: it
recognized that Bristol-Myers abrogated Oklahoma’s “totality of the
contacts” personal jurisdiction approach. Section IV.B explains where
Montgomery went wrong: in overturning Oklahoma’s “stream of
commerce” approach, it conflated that approach with the stream-ofcommerce theory used throughout the rest of the United States. The court,
therefore, inadvertently eliminated any use of stream of commerce to
establish personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.
A. Bristol-Myers Abrogated Oklahoma’s “Totality of the Contacts”
Approach
Montgomery correctly concluded that Bristol-Myers had abrogated
Oklahoma’s “totality of the contacts” approach to specific personal
jurisdiction.91 Bristol-Myers clarified that specific personal jurisdiction does
not exist unless a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are connected to
the claims the plaintiff asserts against it.92 Bristol-Myers, accordingly,
rejected California’s “sliding scale” approach, which allowed the
connection requirement of specific personal jurisdiction to be satisfied by a
defendant’s wide-ranging contacts with the forum state even when they
were unrelated to the underlying controversy. 93 The Court explained that
this type of analysis is not consistent with due process because it
“resembles a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”94
Similar to California’s “sliding scale” approach, Oklahoma’s “totality of
the contacts” approach did not require a connection between the
90. Id. ¶ 38, 414 P.3d at 834.
91. Id. ¶ 27, 414 P.3d at 831.
92. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (“What is
needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific
claims at issue.”).
93. See id. (“Under the [sliding-scale] approach, the strength of the requisite connection
between the forum and the specific claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant has extensive
forum contacts that are unrelated to those claims.”).
94. Id.
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defendant’s contacts with the forum state and the claims asserted against
it.95 In Hough v. Leonard, for example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
upheld personal jurisdiction over nonresident oil-well investors in a feeagreement dispute despite the fact that “each individual contact made by the
nonresidents may not be sufficient standing alone to maintain[] minimum
contacts.”96 The court determined that the investors nonetheless were
subject to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction because one of them had
unrelated leasehold interests in Oklahoma and they had reached out to other
Oklahomans regarding the same well.97 In other words, the court exercised
personal jurisdiction based on the investors’ wide-ranging, unrelated
contacts with Oklahoma.98 Hough illustrates that Montgomery correctly
abrogated the “totality of the contacts” approach because it did not adhere
to due process’s requirement that the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state must be connected to the particular claims asserted against it.
B. Montgomery Mishandled the Stream-of-Commerce Theory
Although Montgomery correctly overturned Oklahoma’s “totality of the
contacts” approach,99 it mistakenly rejected any use of stream of commerce
to establish personal jurisdiction. First, Section IV.B.1 explains that the
widely used stream-of-commerce theory and Oklahoma’s “stream of
commerce” approach are completely different. Second, Section IV.B.2
95. See, e.g., Guffey v. Ostonakulov, 2014 OK 6, ¶ 26, 321 P.3d 971, 980 (“The totality
of [d]efendant’s contacts with Oklahoma constitute more than sufficient minimum contacts
for the exercise of [personal] jurisdiction to be reasonable . . . .”); Hough v. Leonard, 1993
OK 112, ¶ 13, 867 P.2d 438, 444 (“While each individual contact made by the nonresidents
may not be sufficient standing alone to maintain[] minimum contacts, the totality of the
contacts [is] sufficient to exercise personal jurisdiction over the non-residents.”).
96. Hough, ¶ 13, 867 P.2d at 444.
97. Id. The court also observed that the defendants had entered into a contract over the
phone with an Oklahoma company that then hired the plaintiff as a subcontractor. Id. But the
court seemed to think that the identity of the party that initiated that phone call was
irrelevant. Id. (“Regardless of who initiated the contact, the non-residents could have refused
to enter into a contract and thereby alleviated the risk of defending a suit commenced in
Oklahoma.”). A contract alone, however, does not automatically establish minimum contacts
with the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985). The
essential questions that needed to be asked and answered were (1) what acts led to and
flowed from entering into the contract and (2) did those acts constitute reaching out to the
forum state. See id. at 479–80.
98. See Hough, ¶ 13, 867 P.2d at 444 (“[T]he totality of the contacts [is] sufficient to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the non-residents.”).
99. See supra Section IV.A.
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demonstrates that the authority Montgomery relied on does not support
rejecting the widely used stream-of-commerce theory. Third, Section
IV.B.3 observes that Montgomery’s stream-of-commerce discussion was
unnecessary—and, thus, dictum—because Montgomery was not a streamof-commerce case. Finally, Section IV.B.4 suggests that Montgomery
conflated Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach with the stream-ofcommerce theory, resulting in the latter’s inadvertent demise.
1. Stream-of-Commerce Theory v. Oklahoma’s “Stream of Commerce”
Approach
The stream-of-commerce theory is different from Oklahoma’s “stream of
commerce” approach. The stream-of-commerce theory describes one way a
party can reach out to a state. The theory explains that a party reaches out to
a state when it places its products in a distribution channel with the intent to
serve the state’s market.100 The stream-of-commerce theory, in other words,
is merely a means of establishing that a party has reached out to the forum
state. It does not satisfy the separate connection requirement or fairness
requirement for exercising specific personal jurisdiction.101
Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach, by contrast, is a
comprehensive personal jurisdiction analysis that sets forth when an
Oklahoma court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a party—
not merely when a party has reached out to Oklahoma. This approach
worked similarly to Oklahoma’s “totality of the contacts” approach because
it did not require a connection between the defendant’s act of placing its
products into the stream of commerce and the particular claims asserted
against it. 102 Indeed, Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach simply
looked to whether the products arrived in Oklahoma as a result of the
defendant’s purposeful acts and whether exercising jurisdiction over the
defendant would be fair.103 Similar to Oklahoma’s “totality of the contacts”
100. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881–82 (2011) (plurality
opinion); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980).
101. See, e.g., Align Corp. v. Boustred, 421 P.3d 163, 172–73 (Colo. 2017) (affirming
personal jurisdiction over Align because Align placed goods into the stream of commerce,
the plaintiff’s injuries arose out of that act, and asserting personal jurisdiction over Align is
not unfair).
102. See Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 2018 OK 17, ¶ 27, 414 P.3d 824, 831
(noting that the court’s precedents using the “totality of contacts” and “stream of commerce”
approaches worked similarly to the “sliding scale” approach rejected in Bristol-Myers).
103. State ex rel. Edmondson v. Native Wholesale Supply, 2010 OK 58, ¶¶ 25–26, 237
P.3d 199, 209.
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approach and California’s “sliding scale” approach, this approach did not
survive Bristol-Myers because it did not require a connection between a
defendant’s contacts with the forum state and the particular claims asserted
against it.
In sum, the stream-of-commerce theory is a way to establish that a party
has reached out to the forum state. Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce”
approach, by contrast, is a comprehensive personal jurisdiction analysis that
was abrogated by Bristol-Myers because it did not require a connection
between a defendant’s act of reaching out to the forum state and the
particular claims asserted against it. Though the court correctly overturned
this approach in light of Bristol-Myers, it wrongly relied on Bristol-Myers
and other caselaw to do away with the widely used stream-of-commerce
theory as well.
2. Walden and Bristol-Myers Did Not Affect the Stream-of-Commerce
Theory
Despite the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s conclusion that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s silence in Walden and Bristol-Myers as to the stream-ofcommerce theory amounted to “presumptively, at least implicitly, rejecting
such analysis,”104 neither case’s facts called for the stream-of-commerce
theory to establish each defendant’s contact with the forum state. Walden
involved Nevada plaintiffs suing a Georgia defendant in a Nevada court
based on his alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and his
filing of a false affidavit in connection with seizing their cash. 105 The
predicate facts for application of the stream-of-commerce theory—i.e., a
product, a manufacturer, or a distributor—were not present. Bristol-Myers,
similarly, presented no need to use the stream-of-commerce theory because
the parties agreed that the defendant had extensive, direct contacts with the
forum state (California).106 The defendant, indeed, maintained five research
and laboratory facilities and employed over 400 people in California.107 The
Court’s silence in those cases, therefore, was just silence.
104. Montgomery, ¶ 27, 414 P.3d at 831.
105. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 280–81 (2014).
106. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017)
(“Five of [the defendant’s] research and laboratory facilities, which employ a total of around
160 employees, are located there. . . . [The defendant] also employs about 250 sales
representatives in [the forum] and maintains a small state-government advocacy office in
[the forum].”).
107. Id.
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Although Bristol-Myers did not discuss the stream-of-commerce theory,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court was not alone in thinking that Bristol-Myers
had impacted it.108 In Bristol-Myers, over 600 plaintiffs—most of whom
were not California residents—brought state-law claims against the
defendant based on injuries allegedly caused by one of its pharmaceutical
drugs.109 Confronted with a motion to quash service of summons for lack of
personal jurisdiction,110 the plaintiffs raised a last-ditch argument that the
defendant’s decision to contract with a California distributor for its national
distribution scheme subjected it to California’s personal jurisdiction in this
case.111 But there was no evidence “[the defendant] engaged in relevant acts
together with [the distributor] in California” and no evidence showing “how
or by whom [the product] [the plaintiffs] took was distributed to the
pharmacies that dispensed it to them.” 112 The plaintiffs’ stream-ofcommerce argument, in other words, failed due process’s connection
requirement because the plaintiffs did not show the drugs that had caused
their injuries were distributed to their pharmacies by the defendant’s
California distributor. The Court, indeed, implied that if the plaintiffs could
prove that the drugs they had taken had been distributed to their pharmacies
by the defendant’s California distributor, then the defendant’s acts leading
to and flowing from its contract with that distributor might have subjected it

108. See, e.g., Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 780 (3d Cir. 2018)
(differentiating between the pure-stream-of-commerce test and the court’s “deliberate
targeting of the forum” requirement—which is essentially the Asahi plurality’s stream-ofcommerce-plus test—and suggesting that Bristol-Myers rejected the pure-stream-ofcommerce test); Richard A. Dean & Katya S. Cronin, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior
Court: The Last Nail in the Coffin of Stream-of-Commerce Personal Jurisdiction, FOR DEF.,
Jan. 2018, at 22, 25, https://www.tuckerellis.com/webfiles/FTD-1801-Dean-Cronin.pdf
(arguing Bristol-Myers “dea[lt] a fatal blow to the refrain that the new economic realities of
globalization mean that a company with a national distribution network can be sued in any
state”).
109. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777.
110. Id. at 1778.
111. Id. at 1783 (“In a last ditch contention, respondents contend that [Bristol-Myers’]
‘decision to contract with a California company [McKesson] to distribute [Plavix]
nationally’ provides a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction.” (citing Transcript of Oral
Argument at 32, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No.
16-466))).
112. Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 895 (Cal.
2016) (Werdegar, J., dissenting)).
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to California’s personal jurisdiction in this case.113 Bristol-Myers, therefore,
did not impact the stream-of-commerce theory: it simply tells us that—as
with all contacts—stream-of-commerce contacts must be connected to the
claims asserted against the defendant.
Furthermore, the other authorities the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited in
support of its decision, Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Lawson114 and
Murco Wall Products, Inc. v. Galier,115 were remanded by the U.S.
Supreme Court in light of Bristol-Myers116 because of their improper
connection analyses—not their contacts analyses. In Lawson I, the
Arkansas Court of Appeals analyzed “whether the defendant’s conduct
connects him to the forum in a meaningful way” and upheld personal
jurisdiction even though “the relation of the cause of action to the contacts
is weak.”117 On remand, the Lawson II court agreed that its connection
analysis in Lawson I was improper and dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction.118 Similar to Lawson I, in Galier the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals conducted a “totality of the contacts” analysis and concluded that
personal jurisdiction was proper without analyzing whether the defendant’s
contacts were connected to the claims the plaintiff had asserted against it. 119
Both Lawson and Galier were remanded to remedy connection defects, not
contacts defects. Neither, therefore, supports rejecting the stream-ofcommerce theory.
3. Montgomery Was Not a Stream-of-Commerce Case
There was no need for Montgomery to discuss—let alone abrogate—the
stream-of-commerce theory to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. It instead should have simply rejected the plaintiffs’
so-called stream-of-commerce argument as applied to the facts of the case.
The plaintiffs had argued that Airbus and Soloy were both subject to
Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction through the stream-of-commerce theory
113. Id. (implying that evidence of connection between the defendant’s act of contracting
with a forum distributor for its national distribution scheme and the claims asserted against it
may have impacted the Court’s analysis).
114. 511 S.W.3d 883 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017).
115. No. 114,175 (Okla. Civ. App. Feb. 3, 2017) (unpublished).
116. Murco Wall Prods., Inc. v. Galier, 138 S. Ct. 982 (2018) (mem.); Simmons Sporting
Goods, Inc. v. Lawson, 138 S. Ct. 237 (2017) (mem.).
117. Lawson, 511 S.W.3d at 887–88.
118. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 553 S.W.3d 190, 195–96 (Ark. Ct. App.
2018), aff’d, 569 S.W.3d 865 (Ark. 2019).
119. Galier, No. 114,175, ¶¶ 44–46.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

540

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:523

because they knew that EagleMed would use the helicopter in Oklahoma. 120
But there were no stream-of-commerce contacts with Oklahoma because
neither Airbus nor Soloy participated in a distribution channel that resulted
in their products’ sale there.121 Indeed, the helicopter ended up in Oklahoma
only because EagleMed unilaterally chose to fly it there. 122 This was
insufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction under longstanding U.S.
Supreme Court precedent. Recall that in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, the plaintiffs drove their car into Oklahoma after purchasing it in
New York. 123 Even though it was “foreseeable that the purchasers of
automobiles . . . may take [cars] to Oklahoma,” the Court nonetheless
concluded that a consumer’s unilateral act of taking a product into the
forum state does not subject defendants up the distribution chain to that
forum’s personal jurisdiction through the stream-of-commerce theory. 124
The Montgomery court, therefore, should have affirmed the dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction by simply adhering to World-Wide
Volkswagen: mere knowledge that EagleMed would unilaterally choose to
take the helicopter into Oklahoma after the point of sale did not subject
Airbus and Soloy to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction through the streamof-commerce theory.
4. The Source of Montgomery’s Missteps
Montgomery’s missteps can be attributed to its conflation of Oklahoma’s
“stream of commerce” approach with the stream-of-commerce theory. As
discussed above, Bristol-Myers abrogated Oklahoma’s “stream of
commerce” approach but had no impact on the stream-of-commerce theory
widely used throughout the rest of the United States to establish that a party
has reached out to the forum state.125 Conflating these distinct concepts and
blending them into an undifferentiated “stream of commerce” analysis

120. Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 2018 OK 17, ¶¶ 8, 14, 414 P.3d 824, 826,
828.
121. The court noted that the only contacts between EagleMed, Airbus, and Soloy
occurred in Texas and Kansas. Id. ¶ 30, 414 P.3d at 832.
122. Id. ¶ 36, 414 P.3d at 834.
123. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980). See also
supra Section II.B.
124. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S at 298.
125. See supra Sections IV.B.1–2.
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resulted in language ostensibly eliminating any use of stream of commerce
to establish personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.126
Although Montgomery repeatedly rejected any use of stream of
commerce, its concluding paragraph contradicts those statements by
indicating that the stream-of-commerce theory is still viable in Oklahoma.
Montgomery’s final paragraph concludes that Oklahoma lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendants because they did not engage in any
quintessential stream-of-commerce contacts with Oklahoma. 127 The court
observed that the defendants “did not aim [their] products at the Oklahoma
markets . . . [or] solicit business from Oklahoma markets and Oklahoma
residents. Consequently, minimum contacts with the State of Oklahoma
were insufficient.”128
The Oklahoma Supreme Court arguably still recognizes the
constitutional validity of the stream-of-commerce theory because
Montgomery’s final paragraph mentioned stream-of-commerce contacts that
a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court in both Asahi and McIntyre had listed
as capable of satisfying due process requirements.129 The court stated that
the defendants had not established minimum contacts with Oklahoma
because these quintessential stream-of-commerce contacts were not
present.130 Montgomery’s concluding paragraph, therefore, can be
interpreted as preserving the stream-of-commerce theory as a basis for
establishing Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction in fact patterns where the
plaintiff can prove that these quintessential stream-of-commerce contacts
exist.

126. See Montgomery, ¶ 37, 414 P.3d at 834 (“[S]tream of commerce is no longer the
analysis this [c]ourt will use to determine specific personal jurisdiction.”); id. ¶ 27, 414 P.3d
at 831 (asserting that the omission of stream-of-commerce analysis in Walden and BristolMyers amounted to “presumptively, at least implicitly, rejecting such analysis”); id. ¶ 36,
414 P.3d at 833 (concluding that no stream-of-commerce test can establish Oklahoma’s
personal jurisdiction).
127. See id. ¶ 38, 414 P.3d at 834.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (explaining that the stream-of-commerce theory is satisfied when the “defendant
can be said to have targeted the forum”); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) (stating that a product’s placement into the stream of
commerce plus “solicit[ing] business in [the forum state]” satisfies due process).
130. See Montgomery, ¶ 38, 414 P.3d at 834.
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V. Resolving Montgomery
Despite there being room to argue that Montgomery only eliminated
Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach, Montgomery has been
uniformly interpreted as eliminating stream of commerce entirely. 131 The
Western District of Oklahoma, for example, observed that Montgomery
“impl[ies] that any stream-of-commerce approach was abrogated by the
[Bristol-Myers] decision.”132 Moving forward, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has two options to resolve Montgomery’s contradictory treatment of
the stream-of-commerce theory: (1) clarify that Montgomery rejected only
Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach; or (2) explain that
Montgomery also rejected the stream-of-commerce theory but did so for
Oklahoma-specific reasons.
The court can resolve Montgomery’s internal contradiction by clarifying
that when Montgomery discussed and rejected stream of commerce, it was
referring to Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach. Montgomery,
therefore, abrogated only Oklahoma’s “stream of commerce” approach
without impacting the stream-of-commerce theory. If the court intended to
preserve the stream-of-commerce theory as a basis for Oklahoma’s personal
jurisdiction, then it must make that clear. Otherwise, Montgomery will
likely continue to be read as eliminating any use of stream of commerce.133
Alternatively, the court could explain that its decision to eliminate the
stream-of-commerce theory was tied to its interpretation of the Oklahoma
Constitution. Recall that Oklahoma’s long-arm statute is coextensive with
the limits of the U.S. Constitution and Oklahoma’s Constitution. 134 Federal
131. See Cagle v. Rexon Indus. Corp., No. CIV-18-1209-R, 2019 WL 1960360, at *8
(W.D. Okla. May 2, 2019); James M. Beck, Another Domino Teetering–Stream of
Commerce Personal Jurisdiction After BMS, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2018/03/another-domino-teetering-stream-ofcommerce-personal-jurisdiction-after-bms.html; Gary Isaac, Oklahoma High Court Rejects
“Stream of Commerce” Doctrine as Basis for Specific Jurisdiction, WASH. LEGAL FOUND.
(July 27, 2018), https://www.wlf.org/2018/07/27/wlf-legal-pulse/oklahoma-high-courtrejects-stream-of-commerce-doctrine-as-basis-for-specific-jurisdiction/; Steven L. Boldt,
The Death of Stream of Commerce in Aviation Litigation, AM. BAR ASS’N (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/mass-torts/practice/2018/thedeath-of-stream-of-commerce-in-aviation-litigation/.
132. Cagle, 2019 WL 1960360, at *8.
133. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
134. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2004(F) (Supp. 2018) (“A court of this state may exercise
jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of
the United States.”). See also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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due process limits a state’s power to assert personal jurisdiction. 135 But a
state, like Oklahoma, can choose to impose due process requirements on its
courts above and beyond what the U.S. Constitution provides.136
If the court intended to eliminate the stream-of-commerce theory, then it
must justify this choice with reasons tied to the Oklahoma Constitution.
Montgomery ostensibly eliminated the stream-of-commerce theory under
the guise of adhering to the U.S. Constitution’s due process requirements as
set forth in Bristol-Myers.137 But as discussed above, Bristol-Myers was not
a stream-of-commerce case, and it did not impact the stream-of-commerce
theory. 138 The Oklahoma Supreme Court may impose additional limits on
Oklahoma courts’ ability to exercise personal jurisdiction by eliminating
the stream-of-commerce theory, but it must provide an explanation tied to
the Oklahoma Constitution.
VI. Oklahoma Courts Should Interpret Montgomery Narrowly
Montgomery can be—and should be—interpreted as overturning only
Oklahoma’s “totality of the contacts” and “stream of commerce”
approaches to personal jurisdiction. As for Montgomery’s repetitious
rejections of stream of commerce generally, Oklahoma courts should
recognize these statements for what they are: dicta. By interpreting
Montgomery narrowly, the only change to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction
doctrine will be that Oklahoma courts will no longer evaluate whether they
have personal jurisdiction based on an analysis that falls short of due
process by failing to require a connection between the defendant’s contacts
with Oklahoma and the claims asserted against it.
Interpreting Montgomery narrowly, moreover, would preserve the
stream-of-commerce theory as a basis for establishing Oklahoma’s personal
jurisdiction. Montgomery’s contradictory treatment of the stream-ofcommerce theory calls the theory into question, but there is no reason to
deny Oklahoma plaintiffs this avenue for establishing Oklahoma’s personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants until the Oklahoma Supreme Court

135. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (“The Due Process Clause . . .
constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.”).
136. See, e.g., Friedman v. Bloomberg L.P., 884 F.3d 83, 91 n.6 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Federal
due process . . . does not compel a state to provide for jurisdiction . . . . [It, instead,] limits
the extent to which a state court may exercise jurisdiction . . . .”).
137. See Montgomery v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 2018 OK 17, ¶ 36, 414 P.3d 824, 833.
138. See supra Section IV.B.2.
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definitively tells us how Montgomery impacted the stream-of-commerce
theory.
By broadly reading Montgomery’s rejections of stream of commerce,
Oklahoma courts would deprive Oklahoma plaintiffs of the ability to bring
certain products-liability lawsuits in Oklahoma courts and leave an
exploitable gap in Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction doctrine. The streamof-commerce theory came about as a solution to situations where the only
contact a manufacturer or distributor had with the forum state was placing
its products into a distribution channel seeking to serve that state’s
market. 139 A decade ago, in State ex rel. Edmondson v. Native Wholesale
Supply, the Oklahoma Supreme Court aptly explained the stream-ofcommerce theory’s importance: Without the stream-of-commerce theory,
actors up the distribution channel could “engag[e] in carefully structured
transactions that ostensibly take place outside of the State,” allowing actors
to “purposefully . . . target [a product] at Oklahoma,” “reap[] the economic
benefits,” and “evad[e]” Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction. 140
Edmondson elucidates the consequences of interpreting Montgomery
broadly. In Edmondson, Native Wholesale Supply141 sold more than 100
million cigarettes over a fifteen-month period to a Muscogee Creek Nation
retailer, which then sold the cigarettes to Muscogee Creek Nation’s market
and Oklahoma’s market.142 Native Wholesale Supply argued it was not
subject to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction because it was targeting only
the Muscogee Creek Nation’s market.143 But the court found this claim
“disingenuous” because Muscogee Creek Nation’s cigarette demand was
such a small fraction of the total number of cigarettes sold that the
cigarettes’ “ultimate destination” could only be Oklahoma’s market. 144
Native Wholesale Supply, therefore, had deliberately targeted Oklahoma’s
market through its cigarette-distribution scheme. 145 And this was Native

139. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980).
140. 2010 OK 58, ¶ 27, 237 P.3d 199, 209.
141. Native Wholesale Supply is a Sac and Fox Nation chartered corporation with its
principal place of business in Seneca Nation. Id. ¶ 33, 237 P.3d at 210–11.
142. Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 237 P.3d at 208. Although Muscogee Creek Nation is located within
the State of Oklahoma, contacts with Muscogee Creek Nation are not contacts with
Oklahoma because contacts are analyzed “sovereign by sovereign.” See J. McIntyre Mach.,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (plurality opinion).
143. Edmondson, ¶ 22, 237 P.3d at 208.
144. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23–24, 237 P.3d at 208.
145. See id. ¶ 23, 237 P.3d at 208.
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Wholesale Supply’s only contact with Oklahoma. 146 Without the stream-ofcommerce theory, Native Wholesale Supply would have successfully
evaded Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction by funneling its cigarettes into
Oklahoma through a nonresident intermediary.
Interpreting Montgomery broadly would open the door to manufacturers
and distributors deliberately targeting Oklahoma’s market, causing injury to
Oklahomans, and escaping answering for their products’ harms in
Oklahoma courts by simply placing a nonresident intermediary between
themselves and Oklahoma. Oklahoma courts, until instructed otherwise,
should interpret Montgomery narrowly to allow Oklahoma plaintiffs to use
the stream-of-commerce theory as a means of establishing that nonresident
manufacturers and distributors have reached out to Oklahoma.
VII. Conclusion
The stream-of-commerce theory’s status in Oklahoma matters.
Oklahoma imported over $7.5 billion worth of manufactured consumer
goods in 2019.147 Thus, litigation involving products manufactured by
nonresidents is inevitable.
Oklahoma plaintiffs, nonresident manufacturers and distributors,
lawyers, and judges need a clear explanation of Montgomery’s impact on
the stream-of-commerce theory. Montgomery’s contradictory treatment of
the stream-of-commerce theory and sparse explanation for its seemingly
radical change to Oklahoma’s personal jurisdiction doctrine beg the
question of whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court actually intended to
eliminate the stream-of-commerce theory. Without guidance from the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, Oklahoma courts will wade through murky
waters struggling to piece together Montgomery’s ostensible destruction of
stream-of-commerce personal jurisdiction.
Morgan E. Vastag

146. See id. ¶¶ 19–20, 237 P.3d at 207–08 (discussing only Native Wholesale Supply’s
transactions with the Muscogee Creek Nation retailer).
147. Press Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis & U.S. Census Bureau, Monthly U.S.
International Trade in Goods and Services, December 2019, Supplement at exhibit 2a (Feb.
5, 2020), https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2019pr/12/exh2as.pdf (“U.S.
General Imports of Goods by State, State of Destination, by NAICS-Based Product Code
Groupings, Not Seasonally Adjusted: 2019”).
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